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I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (1991) 3 
State v. Martin, AAA Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (2002) 3 
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (1992) 1 
Rules 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a(e) 1,2 
UTAH R. CR. P. 24 1, 2, 3 
IV 
III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter because of its appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-
2a-3(e) (1996). Judge K. L. Mclff denied Defendant's motion for a new trial on 
December 18, 2000. ( 00007). Defendant entered his Notice of Appeal on February 
22,2001. (000010). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Court erred in denying Defendant-Appellant's motion for a 
new trial when the Court determined that there was no " new evidence that would be 
relevant." (T., p. 63, lines 10-11). 
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Taylor reserved this 
issue for appeal as his Motion was timely pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews the trial court's ruling on statutory 
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its 
conclusions. State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992). 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rules 
UTAH R. CR. P. 24. See 00001. 
VL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
David R. Taylor, Defendant, appeals an order denying his Motion for New 
Trial. (00005). The Court denied said Motion on December 18, 2000, and no formal 
Order was prepared. (00007). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Taylor's conviction stems from an altercation with Mark Pennington on or 
about May 13, 2000. David R. Taylor and Mark Pennington were incarcerated at the 
time of this incident. 
VII, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is sufficient new evidence in this matter to warrant further examination 
of this case at hand. During the trial, it was the testimony of Mark Pennington which 
caused the jury to return a guilty verdict. Immediately after trial, Mr. Pennington 
recanted his testimony in a letter written to the trial Court. In said letter, Mr. 
Pennington stated the "Sevier County officers pushed me into this and I never wanted 
any thing to happen Because nothing ever did!" (00003). 
2 
State v. Martin, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (2002), (quoting State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) states the legal standard to be applied when 
considering a motion for new trial is threefold. 
( 1 ) . . . be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered and produced at the trial; (2). . . not be merely cumulative; 
[and] (3) . . . be such as to render a different result probable on the 
on the retrial of the case. 
Clearly the first prong of the James test is met in this case. The letter written 
by Mr. Pennington was not written prior to the trial; therefore, it could not have been 
discovered during or prior to trial. It is also apparent that the second prong is met in 
that this evidence was not cumulative. The third prong is also clearly met because if 
Mr. Pennington testifies according to his letter at a retrial of this case, a different 
result is probable. 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in pertinent part that: 
The court may, upon motion of a party . . . grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the right s of a party. 
In light of Mr. Pennington's recanted testimony, the Court erred in not granting 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
VIII. ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for new trial and in its 
determination that there was no new evidence justifying a new trial. 
3 
IX. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse its decision to deny 
Defendant-Appellants motion for new trial and remand the matter to the trial court for 
a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ,thi day of May, 2002. 
KEITH C. BARNES 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
250 South Main 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
(435) 586-4404 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed tw<^£) true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT thi, 
fully prepaid, to: 
> day of May, 2002, first class postage 
Laura B. Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
KEITH C. BARNES 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
TO THE BRIEF OF 
DAVID R. TAYLOR 
5 
u i/ixi nuL,&s UP OKJLMUNAJb FKOCEDURE 436 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law A.L.R. — Coram nobis on ground of other's 
§ 785 et seq. confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468. 
C.J .S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1453 et 
seq. 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Absence of witness. 
Affidavits of jurors. 
Bias or prejudice of jurors. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect on notice of appeal. 
Evidence in support of motion. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to reopen preliminary rehearing. 
—Dismissal of charges. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Verdict supported by evidence. 
Cited. 
Absence of w i tne s s . 
Where the evidence was discovered before 
trial but the witness was absent, not only must 
diligence have been shown in attempting to 
obtain the testimony of such witness, but an 
application must have been made to obtain a 
postponement of the trial so as to give opportu-
nity to obtain such witness or evidence before 
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 
167 (1931). 
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to 
produce a witness who was unavailable at trial 
where witness' absence was not due to any 
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to 
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and 
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a 
continuance to accommodate the witness' cal-
endar. State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 
1984). 
Affidavits of jurors. 
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which 
recommended leniency was not a chance ver-
dict, and could not be impeached by affidavits of 
eight jurors that they would not have voted 
defendant guilty if they thought he would 
thereby receive a jail sentence. State v. 
Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447 (1939). 
Motion for new trial following rape conviction 
on ground of misconduct of jury was properly 
denied, notwithstanding affidavits of four ju-
rors filed in support of motion reciting that they 
were in favor of acquittal on first ballot but 
that , as one of jurors stated tha t if they found 
defendant guilty with recommendation of le-
niency he would have to serve only a few 
months in jail, they thereupon were persuaded 
to vote for conviction, where affidavits showed 
no coercion or tactics which might have 
stripped any juror of his ability to act in accor-
dance with his honest convictions. State v. 
Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 (1947). 
Jurors could not impeach their verdicts ex-
cept in instances expressly made exceptions by 
legislative enactments and, where a defendant 
submitted affidavits of two jurors to the effect 
that , if the record did not support the conclu-
sion of the stated expert witness then these two 
jurors would not have voted for the verdict, 
such affidavits were conditional and would be of 
no avail to the defendant where the verdict was 
justified by the record. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 
Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), appeal dis-
missed, 368 U.S. 144, 82 S. Ct. 247, 7 L. Ed. 2d 
188, cert, denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82 S. Ct. 246, 7 
L. Ed. 2d 137 (1961). 
A juror's allegation that she misunderstood 
the rule of law pertinent to unanimity would 
not compel the court to grant a new trial where 
the jury had been properly instructed on tha t 
point. State v. Couch, 635 R2d 89 (Utah 1981). 
Bias or prejudice of jurors. 
Where in a first degree murder prosecution, a 
juror falsely stated, on his voir dire, tha t he had 
neither expressed nor formed an opinion con-
00001 
615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980). In line with this 
presumption, Utah Rule of Evidence 412 provides 
both substantive and procedural restraints against the 
introduction of evidence concerning an alleged 
victim's past sexual acts. See Utah R. Evid. 412. 
Specifically, rule 412 prohibits in all criminal 
proceedings the introduction of evidence offered 
either (1) "to prove that any alleged victim engaged in 
other sexual behavior" or (2) "to prove any alleged 
victim's sexual predisposition." Utah R. Evid. 412(a).5 
tyU In the case now before us, the trial court 
excluded the newly discovered evidence concerning 
Egan's acceptance of a ride from a stranger in 
September 1996 based on the assumption that Martin 
was offering the evidence to prove that "because . . . 
Egan ha[d] willingly gotten into a car with a strange 
man in the past, she has a certain sexual 
predisposition." Despite this reasoning, Martin argued 
both below and on appeal that he is "not seeking to 
admit into evidence any information concerning 
Egan's sexual behavior or predisposition." Rather, 
Martin avers that he wishes to introduce the evidence 
for the limited purpose of demonstrating Egan's 
"casual attitude toward strangers," her 
"impulsiveness," and her "irresponsibility." Indeed, 
the trial court itself admitted that Martin did not 
intend to introduce evidence of Egan's past sexual 
behavior. In its order denying Martin's motion for a 
new trial, the court reasoned: 
[T]he State argues that any evidence 
concerning the prior rape is inadmissible 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 412. This 
argument is moot because . . . the defense 
[previously] clarified it would not seek to 
introduce any evidence of Ms. Egan's prior 
sexual activity, including the prior rape. 
Instead, the defense is seeking solely to 
introduce evidence of Ms. Egan's willingness 
to meet and travel with a stranger under very 
similar circumstances to [this] case. 
Importantly, however, the lower court's determination 
in this regard—that any objection to the newly 
discovered evidence on the basis of rule 412's 
prohibition against evidence of an "alleged victim's 
sexual behavior" is moot in this case—must likewise 
apply to the rule's prohibition on evidence of an 
"alleged victim's sexual predisposition" as it applies 
here. Id. 
\A2 Although rule 412 precludes evidence that 
"directly referfs] to sexual activities or thoughts" as 
well as evidence that "may have a sexual connotation 
for the fact finder," the evidence of Egan's accepting 
a ride from a stranger in September 1996 simply 
possesses no sexual connotation, insinuation, or 
overtone. Utah R. Evid. 412 advisory committee note 
(emphasis added). Rather, given Martin's averment 
that he will not introduce "any evidence concerning 
Egan's sexual behavior or predisposition," including 
the alleged prior rape, a jury could no more 
reasonably deduce that Egan engaged in—or was 
forced to engage in—sexual acts with the stranger than 
it could conclude they played board games, built 
model airplanes, or ate sandwiches. While we 
acknowledge that rule 412 should be construed 
broadly in order to fully effectuate the policy 
considerations underlying its prohibitions, we refuse 
to extend the rule's circumference of influence to 
evidence as sexually innocuous as that at issue here. 
See id. Such a result would both impermissibly 
contradict the purpose of the rule itself and endanger 
the delicately balanced scope and effect of this 
jurisdiction's other evidentiary rules. See, e.g., State 
v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f31, 20 P.3d 271 ("When 
interpreting an evidentiary rule, we apply principles 
of statutory construction."); Butler v. Naylor, 1999 
UT 85,1(9, 987 P.2d 41 (same); State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388,396-99 (Utah 1989) (noting the careful 
balance among certain evidentiary rules); State v. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 554 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (same). Moreover, we note that to the 
degree information concerning Egan's sexual 
behavior or predisposition might somehow become 
implicated by the introduction of evidence concerning 
her acceptance of a ride from a stranger in September 
1996, nothing in rule 412 would prevent the trial 
court from carefully directing the scope of 
questioning away from such inadmissible information 
or from issuing a limiting instruction to ensure that 
evidence prohibited by rule 412 is not considered by 
the jury as a general matter. See Utah R. Evid. 412; 
see also, e.g., State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 
(Utah 1989) (noting that trial courts may properly 
protect interests of a witness by limiting scope of 
questioning to exclude inadmissible evidence); State 
v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1981) (same). 
T[43 Consequently, we hold that the trial court 
erred by deeming inadmissible the newly discovered 
evidence at issue here as violating rule 412's 
prohibition on sexual proclivity evidence. Therefore, 
in accordance with our determination that the 
evidence is relevant and would not have constituted 
impermissible character propensity evidence at trial, 
we further hold that the court erred in reaching its 
ultimate conclusion that the evidence was 
inadmissible. See supra Hf 34, 38. 
II. NEW TRIAL 
^44 Having determined that the evidence 
concerning Egan's acceptance of a ride from a 
stranger in September 1996 would have been 
admissible at Martin's trial, we now turn to the 
question of whether the trial court properly denied 
-Martin's motion for a new trial. 
f45 "When reviewing a trial court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial, we will not reverse 'absent a 
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.'" State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 12,994 P.2d 177 (quoting State 
v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)); see 
also State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 31,37 P.3d 1073; 
State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). At 
the same time, however, we review the legal 
standards applied by the trial court in denying the 
motion for correctness. Eisner, 2001 UT 99 at 131; 
see also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 28,979 P.2d 
799. The legal standard to be applied when 
considering a motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence is threefold: In order to 
constitute grounds for a new trial, the evidence must 
" (1) . . . be such as could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered and produced 
at the trial; ( 2 ) . . . not be merely cumulative; 
[and] (3) . . . be such as to render a different 
result probable on the retrial of the case." 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149,153,449 
P.2d 993,996 (1969)); see also Martin 1,1999 UT 72 
at 15. 
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On this day personally appeared before me A | /\Yl K » &0 to LO kro+J to me known to be the 
individual, or individuals described in and who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that 
he signed the same as bis free and voluntary act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. Given under 
my hand and official seal this 23rd day of September, 2000. 
\J^/j>^lL_j (X {JAAJC^O,, 
Notary Pjrfbjic 
Residing at: Aurora, Utah 
Commission Expires: 2/16/01 
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo — -
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID R. TAYLOR, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 991600117 FS 
Judge David L. Mower 
Comes now the defendant, David R. Taylor, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for a new trial invoking the due process 
provisions of both the State and U.S. Constitutions. This motion is based upon the facts 
attested to by Mark Pennington, which has been filed with the Court. 
Said Motion is filed pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the accompanying memorandum of point and authorities, which memorandum is 
incorporated herein and annexed hereto by this reference. 
nnnn^ 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2000. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: R. Don Brown, Sevier County 
Attorney, 835 East 300 North, Suite 100, Richfield, Utah 84701. 
Dated this 3rd day of October, 2000. 
nnnnc 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SEVIER COURT 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID R. TAYLOR, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No: 001600176 FS 
Judge: K L MCIFF 
Date: December 18, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: janetb 
Prosecutor: BROWN, R. DON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 6, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: 502 Tape Count: 3:10 
CHARGES 
1. ASSAULT BY PRISONER - 3rd Degree Felony 
HEARING 
TAPE: 502 COUNT: 3:10 
On record this is a hearing to examine the testimony of Mark 
Pennington. Pennington is present with counsel, John Hummel. 
Witness sworn. 
TIME: 3:09 PM State inquires about a letter wit sent to Judge 
Mclff. Wit stated that .he was told by Farnsworth and 2 others after 
the trial to write a letter to the judge and was told what to 
write. 
TIME: 3:13 PM Wit claims that his testimony at trial was the 
truth but not the information in the statement. 
TIME: 3:14 PM Cross exam. Robbi Farnsworth told wit that if he 
did not write the letter or call Oliver, harm would come to his 
family. 
TIME: 3:17 PM Stipulation that the tape was the interview with 
Paqe 1 
Case No: 001600176 
Date: Dec 18, 2000 
wit and Deputy Bill Brewer. Tape was played for the court. Exhibit 
#1 rec'd. 
TIME: 3:31 PM Exhibit #2 of phone conversation with Bruce Oliver 
was played for the court. 
TIME: 3:46 PM Exhibit 2 rec!d. Wit still claims that he 
testified truthfully at trial. 
TIME: 3:51 PM Redirect - Wit has never talked with Brown except 
at trial. 
TIME: 3:53 PM Mr. Hummel asks wit about the higher bail issue 
and perjury concerns. 
TIME: 3:56 PM Court makes inquires of the witness. 
TIME: 4:01 PM Wit excused. 
State has no witnesses. 
Patricia Taylor sworn and testified that Pennington told her that 
he had not told the truth at the trial. She took him to Mclff's 
home and she was with him when he wrote up the statement and signed 
it. 
TIME: 4:13 PM Cross exam - she kept the original statement & 
sent copies to Brown & Mclff. 
TIME: 4:15 PM Def David Taylor sworn and testified that he never 
passed notes to Pennington, never told him that Oliver would 
represent him. 
TIME: 4:18 PM Oliver requests a continuance to contact Mike & 
Clayton Taylor and Robbi Farnsworth. State objects. Court will hear 
arguments on testimony that is now in. 
TIME: 4:20 PM Closing argument by Oliver. 
TIME: 4:35 PM Closing argument by Don Brown. 
TIME: 4:43 PM Statement of John Hummel. 
TIME: 4:46 Court finds that the information discussed here today 
was not presented at trial, not had it happened. Court finds 
Pennington's testimony to be credible, that deffs statement today 
was weak. 
TIME: 4:45 PM Court is not satisfied that there is any new 
evidence and not enough to grant a new trial or to arrest judgment. 
Motions are denied. Sentencing set .for Jan 30 at 10:00. 
qe 2 
Case No: 001600176 
Date: Dec 18, 2000 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/30/2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Room 200 
STATE COURTS BUILDING 
895 East 300 North 
RICHFIELD, UT 84701 
before Judge K L MCIFF 
Paqe 3 (last) 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
) 










Comes now the defendant, David R. Taylor, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended), hereby gives notice 
that he appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final judgment and order of the Honorable 
K.L.McIff, of the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Sevier County, State of Utah for his 
denial of a new trial pertaining to Mark Pennington's testimony. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2001. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
OF APPEAL, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100, Richfield, Utah 84701. 
Dated this 23rd day of February, 2001. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY/FAXING/MAILING 
T FTEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
faxed this O f j ^ d a y of July, 2001, to: 
Court of Appeals 
Via Facsimile 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT % 
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